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COMMENTS
TrrE To PitOPETY: THE INCOME TAX REFu N CHECK As AN AssEr OF
THE WAGE EARNER's BANKIuprcy ESTATE.
Californian Michael Cedor may not feel that he is on the front
line of a battlefield, but he is. Around him revolves a heated legal
debate over the issue of whether an employee who files a petition in
bankruptcy may retain any asset of value with which to begin his
new life. At first glance the issue may seem to be a minor one, but
the reader should look closer. When an employee contemplates his
financial problems, usually with creditors close at his heels, and
makes his decision to file for bankruptcy, he may naturally assume
that any tangible thing which he possesses will be sold and the
proceeds distributed among those creditors. Michael Cedor did some
thinking, consulted an attorney, and started his new life with a little
pocket money-his income tax refund.
In many employee bankruptcies, a tax refund check is the only
asset of any value upon which creditors may levy. Properly filed and
perfected security interests remove many goods from the trustee's
reach, and thus it is understandable why the issue of who receives
the bankrupts income tax refund check is being so vigorously con-
tested. The final outcome may well mean the difference in the small
creditor receiving some payment in satisfaction of his claim or none
at all.
As a general rule, if an item is found to be "property" within the
meaning of section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act,' title to it vests in
1 § 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110a(5) (1970) reads as
follows:
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt... shall... be vested by
operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing
of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, except insofar as
it is to property which is held to be exempt, to all of the following kinds
of property wherever located . .. (5) property, including rights of
action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means
have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under
judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or
sequestered: Provided, That rights of action ex delicto for libel, slander,
injuries to the person of the bankrupt or of a relative, whether or not
resulting in death, seduction and criminal conversion shall not vest in
the trustee unless by the law of the State such rights of action are sub-
ject to attachment execution, garnishment, sequestration, or other ju-
dicial process: And provided further, That when any bankrupt, who is a
natural person, shall have any insurance policy which has a cash sur-
render value payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives,
(Continued on next page)
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the trustee by operation of law on the date the bankruptcy petition is
filed. Whether an income tax refund is such property is an issue that
has generated a clear split between the Ninth and Second Circuits,
a division which appears to be ultimately resolvable only by the
Supreme Court.
In In re Cedor2 the Ninth Circuit held that income tax refunds are
not "property" as defined in section 70a(5). In that case, two em-
ployee bankrupts filed their bankruptcy petitions prior to the close of
the calendar tax year. After the tax year ended, they filed for and
received federal income tax refunds; and, as ordered by the referee
in bankruptcy, each turned over to the trustee the apportioned
amount of the refund check which represented withholdings from
wages earned prior to the date that the petition in bankruptcy was
led. Cedor sought to recover 75% of the portion turned over to the
trustee, claiming that the refunds were not "property" within the
meaning of 70a(5) and thus did not pass to the trustee, and alterna-
tively that if the title to the refund check did pass to the trustee, this
constituted a "garnishment" of "disposable earnings" as defined in
the Consumer Credit Protection Act s and that 75% of the refund check
consequently was exempt as earnings.
The amount withheld from a taxpayer's wages is determined by
the information which he supplies on his W-4 form. To a certain
degree, the wage earner can control the amount to be withheld by
choosing the number of exemptions he claims. For example, a married
worker with two children could ordinarily claim a maximum of four ex-
emptions. The amount then withheld from his wages would represent
the mandatory minimum, i.e., he would maximize his take-home pay.
On the other hand, such a worker might choose, voluntarily, to declare
zero exemptions. This would cause a larger amount to be withheld
from his paycheck. Actual tax liability in a given year is con-
stant. Thus, by choosing the number of exemptions that he claims,
the wage earner can utilize withholdings as a type of savings device.
By choosing to declare less exemptions than those to which he is
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
he may, within thirty days after the cash surrender value has been
ascertained and stated to the trustee by the company issuing the same,
pay or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and stated, and con-
tinue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of the
creditors participating in the distribution of his estate under the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as
assets....
2 337 F. Supp. 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd per curiam sub non. In re James,
470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub norm. Walsh v. Cedor, 411 U.S. 973
(1973).
83The Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1970), is dis-
cussed in detail infra.
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statutorily entitled, an excess of amount withheld over tax liability
is created, and the wage earner assures himself of a refund.
The Cedor court distinguished "forced" overpayment of taxes from
voluntary overpayment. Since forced overpayment occurred when
the mandatory minimum required by law to be withheld from
wages created a surplus over actual tax liability, the portion of
the tax refund check attributable to such forced withholding was
not 70a(5) property, the court held, and thus did not pass to the
trustee. That portion of the refund check which was generated through
the decision of the bankrupt not to declare exemptions on his W-4
form to which he was entitled the court held to be 70a(5) "property"
which passed to the trustee. Although such a portion as was traceable
to optional withholding was "property" under 70a(5), 75% of that portion
was exempt and did not pass to the trustee; the court held that to
take that entire portion would constitute a "garnishment".
In In re Kokoszka4 the Second Circuit held that income tax refunds
are 70a(5) "property". Kokoszka filed his bankruptcy petition after
the close of the calendar tax year. The tax refund claim in Kokoszka
was thus both determinable and enforceable, while in Cedor it was an
inchoate, indeterminable claim because the calendar tax year had not
yet closed. The Second Circuit held that Kokoszka's entire refund
check was "property" within the meaning of 70a(5) and that the
Consumer Credit Protection Act did not compel the trustee to return
75% of the refund to the bankrupt. The court expressly noted the
Ninth Circuit's holding in Cedor, but refused to follow it.
A careful analysis of the historical genesis of the concept of
"property" as it is embodied in the Bankruptcy Act and pertinent case
law reveals two divergent lines of reasoning with respect to whether or
not a given asset is "property" within the meaning of the Act.
One line of thinking, which may be called the "traditional" line,
holds that the purpose of the Act is to secure everything of value
which a bankrupt possesses at the cleavage point of bankruptcy-the
filing of the petition. Having secured all property and interests in
property, whether valuable or not, the Act then provides for an
equitable distribution of these assets among the bankrupts creditors.
This goal having been accomplished, the bankrupt is granted his dis-
charge and given a "fresh start".
The other line of reasoning, which may accurately be called
"reasoning from equitable principles", argues that the primary pur-
pose of the Bankruptcy Act is to grant the bankrupt a fresh start and
4479 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Kokoszka v. Belford,
414 U.S. 1091 (1973).
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free him from the entanglement of past indebtedness. If passing a
given asset to the trustee as property interferes with the financial
rebirth of the debtor, the asset cannot be classified as 70a property,
for to so hold would vitiate the policy dictates of the Act.
An examination of historical background is relevant here. Present
day theories of what is and is not "property" within the meaning of
the Bankruptcy Act are in part a function of the Act's history and the
place of the concept of "property" within it.
Tim CoNcEPT oF PoPERTY
The title to and rights in the bankrupt's property which pass to
the trustee are covered by section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act. Sub-
section (a) of section 70 sets out the non-exempt property and property
interests which vest in the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt by
operation of law as of the date of the filing of the petition. The prior
.Bankruptcy Acts of 1800,5 1841,6 and 18677 had similar provisions, but
none was as comprehensive8 in scope as that of the Act of 1898.9 The
Chandler Act of 1938,10 however, extensively changed section 70. One
author writes that "[s]ome of the changes were merely declaratory
of or clarified existing law while others expanded the section to cover
fields totally or partially untouched before by legislative enactment."n
Clause (5) of section 70 is the most comprehensive in the section
and appears broad enough to cover most of the property listed in
other clauses.
12
Past case law often advanced the argument that the section 70a
enumeration, of the kinds of property which pass to the trustee was
not intended to be an exclusive list. The section should not be so
narrowly construed, so the argument ran, as to deprive the trustee
of any valuable interest belonging to the bankrupt. However valid
this statement may have been at a prior time, it is today no longer
correct.13 When unusual or unique interests arise that can not be
found within the enumerating clauses of the section, the better view
5 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ P, 5, 11, 13, 50, 2 Stat. 21, 23, 24, 25, 34.
6 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9 § 3 5 Stat. 442-43.
7 Bankruptcy Act of 1867,. c. 176, 4§ 14-16, 14 Stat. 522-24.
840 TExAs L. REv. 569, 569-70 (1962).
9 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70, 30 Stat. 565 (amended by 52 Stat.
879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1970)).
10Ch. 575, § 70, 52 Stat. 879 (1938).
.11 40 TExAs L. RExv. 569, 570 (1962).12 4A W. CoLLE R, BAKnu-rcy 9 70.15, at 136 (14th ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as COLLUMI].
13 The statement is found in In re Baudouine, 96 F. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1899),
rev'd on other grounds, 101 F. 574 (2d Cir. 1900), and has been followed in other
cases, notably Board of Trade v. Weston, 243 F. 332 (7th Cir. 1917). This
dictum, as noted in the text, is no longer accurate. See 4A Cozm.ma U 70.07 n.17.
See also 42 TEXAS L. REv. 542 (1964).
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seems to be that one--ascertains whether the interest should be in-
corporated into section 70a by applying the principle of ejusdem
generis.14 As will be demonstrated later, this question becomes
obfuscated when te Supreme Court, as it has in recent bankruptcy
decisions, applies equitable principles in clear contravention of the
statutory language of the Bankruptcy Act.
Clause (5) contains but two specific restrictions 15 (certain rights
of action and life insurance policies) and establishes a two-fold test
to be applied in determining what types of property pass by operation
of law to the trustee: at the date of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, could the "property" in question have been (1) transferred
by the bankrupt, or (2) levied upon and sold under judicial process
against the bankrupt or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered.16
For an asset to meet this test and pass to the trustee, only one of' the
two conditions need be fulfiUed; both are not required. Also, 70a(5)
does not include property which is capable of being levied upon or
transferred but which is exempt under state or federal law from
execution or seizure.' 7
Prior to the Chandler Act of 1938, amending section 70a, the
general rule was that a determinable and enforceable claim for, an
income tax refund passed to the trustee.18 Before the enactment of
this amendment, however, there were some interests which passed to
the trustee only upon the happening (or non-happening) of fortuitous
circumstances, viz., certain contingent and executory interests.' 9 A
14 See Comment, 12 N.Y.L.F. 311, 312 (1966). The author therein argues
that principles of sui generis should be applied to ascertain whether a unique
interest falls within the scope of section 70a. This is, of course, incorrect, since sui
generis means that the interest would be the only one of the class, while under
ejusdem generis it would meet the test if it were of a similar class.
15 See the text of § 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § l10a(5)
(1970), set out in note 1 supra.
10 C. NADLER, THE LAW OF BANuer rcy § 272 (2d ed. 1965).
17 An income tax refund may be exempt under state law. See, e.g., In re
Perry, 225 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
18 See, e.g., Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1925).
19 As explained in the text above, prior to passage of the Chandler Act,
contingent and executory interests were covered under § 70a(5) of the Act; To
prevent the bankrupt from utilizing technical loopholes in the law in order to
block passage of these interests, the Chandler Act added clause (7) and the first
two paragraphs following, but not a part of, clause (8). See 4A CoLIaan I 70.03 at
36-87. Clauses (7), (8), and the paragraphs following clause (8) set forth the
following:
(7) contingent remainders, executory devises and limitations, rights of
entry for condition broken, rights or possibilities of reverter, and like
interests in real property, which were nonassignable prior to bankruptcy
and which, within six months thereafter become assignable interests or
estates or give rise to powers in the bankrupt to acquire assignable
interests and estates; -and (8) property held by an assignee for the benefit
of creditors appointed under an assignment which constituted an act of -
(Continued on next page)
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leading bankruptcy treatise explains that the addition of clause (7)
and the first two paragraphs following, but not a part of, clause (8)
reflect a desire to include within the bankrupt's estate certain
contingent and executory interests and thus permit a realization on
assets which formerly escaped bankruptcy for technical reasons
unnecessarily favorable to the bankrupt. Prior to the 1938 Act,
if a contingent interest was assignable under state law it passed
to the trustee by virtue of § 70a (5). But where such interests were
not assignable under state law, the bankrupt was enabled to divest
himself of his debts through bankruptcy and yet possibly come into
great wealth during the administration of his estate by virtue of the
ripening of contingent or executory interests untouched by bank-
ruptcy.... This was characterized as 'virtually a fraud upon the
act.' 20
Further, there is near unanimity among those vho have researched
the legislative history of the Chandler Act that the intent of Congress
in enacting it was to expand the coverage of section 70a in order to
further an equitable distribution of the property of the bankrupt
among his creditors.21 Even prior to the enactment of the amendment,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
bankruptcy, which property shall, for the purposes of this Act, be
deemed to be held by the assignee as the agent of the bankrupt and
shall be subject to the summary jurisdiction of the court.
All property, wherever located, except insofar as it is property which
is held to be exempt, which vests in the bankrupt within six months
after bankruptcy by bequest, devise or inheritance shall vest in the
trustee and his successor or successors, if any, upon his or their appoint-
ment and qualification, as of the date when it vested in the bankrupt,
and shall be free and discharged from any transfer made or suffered by
the bankrupt after bankruptcy.
All property, wherever located, except insofar as it is property which
is held to be exempt, in which the bankrupt has at the date of bank-
ruptcy an estate or interest by the entirety and which within six months
after bankruptcy becomes transferable in whole or in part solely by the
bankrupt shall, to the extent it becomes so transferable, vest in the trustee
and his successor or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment
and qualification as of the date of bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 70a(7), (8), and § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110a(7), (8), and
§ 110a (1970).
Reasoning by analogy, one can make a strong argument that since the
Chandler Act was enacted to remove some technical loopholes and to increase
the scope of the coverage of 70a, and that since determinable and enforceable
refund claims had been held to pass to the trustee in prior case law, to permit
the bankrupt to have the windfall created when he files his bankruptcy petition
prior to the close of the calendar year would defeat clear congressional intent.
.Once again, the bankrupt would be able to take advantage of a technicality,
and well-advised bankrupts would always file their petitions prior to December 31
if they were contemplating bankruptcy in the latter part of a year. The similarity
between contingent interests and inchoate tax refund claims is obvious, and the
analogy seems warranted.
20 4A COLLIER U 70.03 at 37.
21 See, e.g., McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 H~nv. L. REV.
583, 604-05 (1927) for an analysis of what the drafters of the 1898 Bankruptcy
Act meant the scope of § 70a to be.
(Continued on next page)
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case law insisted that the various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
should be broadly construed when such construction was necessary
to carry out congressional intent and where narrow construction would
achieve the opposite result, permitting the bankrupt to stand on the
technicalities of the language of the law.
22
The general rule, discussed above, which held that tax refunds
were property under section 70a(5) which passed to the trustee was
not changed by passage of the Chandler Act; 23 and the issue, con-
sidered relatively settled, was one which generated little litigation
until the early 1960's.
Increasing Litigation Creates a Circuit Split
It must be pointed out here that these earlier cases concerned
situations where the claim for an income tax refund was both de-
terminable and enforceable, that is, the refund sought was for the
year pior to the filing of the petition for bankruptcy. Inchoate tax
refund claims, those claims which arose when the petition was filed
during the calendar year for which a tax refund was sought, presented
an entirely different question; the claim for refund here was not
even determinable, since there would always be a question of just how
much of a refund, if any, was owed. The courts were also confronted
with the question of whether the refund claim was transferable, since
the Federal Assignment of Claims Act2 4 arguably prohibited assign-
ment of claims against the government.
In In re Goodson,2 5 a California district court held that when a
bankruptcy petition was filed prior to the close of the calendar year,
the tax refund should be prorated and that the trustee was entitled
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
For an extensive analysis of the amendment provisions, see AN-ALYsrs or H.R.
12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1936), quoted in pertinent part in 4A COLLM
19 70.03. The most revealing portion of this analysis reads, with respect to the
reasons for including the provisions on contingent and executory interests:
To an extent this involves a departure from the strict theory of the date
of cleavage, but the bankrupt ought not to get the benefit of all legal
complications at the expense of creditors. The vesting of such property
is usually independent of the bankrupt's economic efforts and has no
relation to his normal budget, so the usual reasons assigned for leaving
him his after acquired property do not apply.
ANA.LYsis at 226, quoted in 4A CoLLia U 70.03 at 38 (emphasis added).2 2 In re Cantelo Mfg. Co., 185 F. 276 (D. Me. 1911).
2 3 See, e.g., Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955).
24 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1970). The statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
All transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States,
or any part or share thereof, or interest therein, whether absolute or
conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor . . . shall
be absolutely null and void, unless they are freely made and executed
in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, after the allowance of
such claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a
warrant for the payment thereof.
25208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
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only to that part of the refund attributable to withholdings from the
bankrupts wages prior to the time he filed his petition. With respect
to the argument that the Assignment of Claims Act prohibited assign-
ment of the inchoate claim, the court stated that while such an assign-
ment was not enforceable as against the government because of the
statute, it nevertheless operated as an equitable assignment which
would be enforceable by the assignee (the trustee) against the as-
signor (the bankrupt). 26
The Third Circuit, in In re Sussman,27 indicated that the reasoning
adopted by Goodson was to be strictly confined and limited to the
facts of that case, that is, it applied only to refund claims that the
bankrupt could have presented at the time the petition was Med.
Sussman, in contrast, involved an inchoate claim, which was further
limited by the Assignment of Claims Act.23 The Sussman court held
that the bankrupt had no vested or transferable property in his
inchoate tax refund claim and thus nothing which could pass to the
trustee under section 70a(5). The court pointed out that while they
felt the conclusion, considering the existing case law and statutes,
to be an "inevitable" one, they nonetheless called the result "unfortu-
nate" and "a windfall to the bankrupt at the expense of the creditors."2
The Fifth Circuit, in Segal v. Rochelle,30 reached a result directly
in conflict with that of Sussman. Noting that the case was similar,
on its facts, to Sussman,31 the court nonetheless held ". . . that an
inchoate right to receive a . . . refund is 'property', and that it is
property which the bankrupt could 'by any means have transferred'
within the meaning of [§ 70a(5)]."32 The court thereupon awarded
the refund to the trustee.
The Circuit Split Resolved
To resolve the split between the Third and Fifth Circuits, the
Supreme Court heard Segal 3 on certiorari.34 In Segal the trustee had
26 Id. at 847.
27289 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1961). Sussman was met by several critical writings
which excoriated the decision as being quite contrary to the le,.slative trend
which bad been to expand section 70a and thereby further the 'theme of the
Bankruptcy Act"-an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's assets among his
creditors. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 818 U.S. 215 (1941).
See also 14 STAN. L. REv. 880 (1962).
28289 F.2d 76, 77-78.
29 Id. at 78. For a discussion of Goodson and Sussman, see Calvery, Income
Tax Refunds Due Wage Earners, 89 REF. J. 8 (1965). For another case following
the Sussman reasoning, see Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318 F.2d 525 (1st Cir. 1963).
30 336 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1964).
31 Id. at 299.
821d. at 303.
83382 U.S. 375 (1966).34 Segal v. Rochelle, 880 U.S. 931 (1965).
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filed claims for loss carryback tax refunds due Gerald and Sam Segal
as individuals and on behalf of their partnership; the loss carryback
refund was generated by losses incurred by the partners during the
year in which the bankruptcy petition was filed. One writer has
stated that:
The primary obstacle facing the Supreme Court was that under
section 70a(5) of the Act the trustee acquired the property of
the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition; and, as a
general rule, property subsequently acquired belongs to the bank-
rupt. Two previous decisions [Sussman and Fournier], which the
Supreme Court later rejected in Segal, had held that such claims
were not property which would pass to the trustee. Both [Sussman
and Fournier] ... had been in great part based on the reasoning
that since the tax laws allowed a loss carryback refund to be made
only when the tax year had ended, the claimed refund was too
tenuous an interest to be classified as property under section
70a .... s5
In an article"8 which almost certainly influenced the Court in its
holding in Segal and which the trustee respondent cited in his brief,87
a referee in bankruptcy argued that Congress intended section 70a
"to cover all assets and estate of a bankrupt that can in any manner
be made legally available for the payment of his debts"38 Although
not completely persuaded by respondent's arguments, the Court held
that:
The main thrust of 70a(5) is to secure for creditors everything of
value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when
he files his petition. To this end the term "property" has been
construed most generously and an interest is not outside its reach
because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be
postponed.... However, limitations on the term do grow out of
other purposes of the Act; one purpose which is highly prominent
... is to leave the bankrupt free after the date of his petition to ac-
cumulate new wealth in the future.39
The guiding criterion under 70a(5), as indicated above, is trans-
ferability or leviability.40 The Court in Segal found little difficulty
in holding that the transferability test had been met:
35 Comment, 12 N.Y.L.F. 311 (1966).86 Herzof, Bankruptcy Law-Modern Trends, 36 REF. J. 18 (1962).
37 Brief or Respondent at 4 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). The
Respondent's brief also heavily refied on 14 STAN. L. REv. 380 (1962). See, e.g.,
Brief for Respondent at 5-6 and 14 STAx. L. REay. 380, 381.38 Herzog, Bankruptcy Law-Modem Trends, 36 RaF. J. 18, 19 (1962)
(emphasis added).
39 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
40Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924); In re Coleman, 87
F.2d 753 (2d Cir. 1937).
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[It] decided that the restriction prohibiting assignment of claims
against the government where the amount is not ascertained, as
provided for by the Federal Assignment of Claims Act, was not
applicable to tax refund claims for the reason that the Federal As-
signment of Claims Act contemplates a voluntary transfer and not
one by operation of law.41
Having held that income tax refund claims were transferable by
operation of law and with the above-discussed policy considerations
in mind, the Court said the test for determining whether the refund
claim was property under 70a(5) was whether it was "sufficiently
rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled with the
bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered fresh start that it should
be regarded as 'property' under § 70a(5) ."42 The Court, obviously
disapproving the reasoning of Sussman and Fournier, concluded that
it was. 43 This was one of the most liberal constructions and expansive
definitions of 70a(5) property ever rendered by the Supreme Court.
MODIFCATON OF THE CONCEPT OF PROPFRTY BY EQurABLE PRINCIPLFS
In the landmark case of Lines v. Frederick44 the Supreme Court, in
a brief per curiam opinion, affirmed a Ninth Circuit case45 which had
held that accrued but unpaid vacation pay was not property within
the meaning of section 70a(5) and thus did not pass to the trustee.
In a radical departure from the Segal rationale, the Court concluded:
The most important consideration limiting the breadth of the
definition of "property" lies in the basic purpose of the Bankruptcy
Act to give the debtor a "new opportunity in life and a clear field
for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement
of pre-existing debt."
40
No longer is the main thrust of the Act to secure everything of value
that the bankrupt might possess in order to further an equitable dis-
tribution among the creditors; this was the Segal theory of the policy
behind the Act. What in Segal was cited as another "highly promi-
nent '47 purpose has now become the raison d'etre. The guiding
criterion of transferability or leviability has now become secondary
to equitable considerations.4"
41 C. NADLEn, THE LAW or BANRrupTcY § 275a (2d ed. 1965); 382 U.S.
375, 382-84 (1966).
42 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
43 Id.
44 400 U.S. 18 (1970).45 Frederick v. Lines, 425 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1970).
46400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970), citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244-45 (1934) (emphasis added).
47 382 U.S. 375 379 (1966).
48 Several artices have pointed out this sudden predominance of equitable
(Continued on next page)
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Ordinarily, whether the property in question could have been
transferred, levied upon and sold, impounded, seized, or sequestered
is a matter to be determined by the applicable state or federal law,
usually the former.49 When the federal courts have declined to follow
local law, the reason has generally been that the state courts have
defined "property" in such a manner as to prevent the passing of
assets which ought to have been within the reach of 70a(5). As is
pointed out by the Ninth Circuit in Lines:
It is unnecessary for us to decide whether. . Mr. Frederick...
could have transferred his right to receive his vacation pay, or
whether creditors could have reached those expectancies, because
even if [it could have been done], we think that a transfer of those
rights to the trustee impairs the bankrupt's abilities to make an un-
encumbered fresh start. An asset is not deemed "property" for
the purpose of applying section 70a(5), if a transfer of that asset
to the trustee interferes with the bankrupt's freedom after the date
of his petition to accumulate new wealth.51
Under California law, accrued vacation pay would have been transfer-
able52 or leviable, and the court, by contracting its definition of prop-
erty, prevents these assets from passing. "Thus, the Court subverts
its traditional policy of sweeping all assets of value into the bank-
ruptcy estate to its concern for giving the debtor a 'fresh start' after
bankruptcy:
5 a
The "fresh start" doctrine seems to have originated in Wetmore v.
Alarkoe.54 The Lines court cites another decision along the road
carved out by the "fresh start" doctrine-Local Loan Co. v. Hunt55-for
the proposition that the various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act were
adopted in light of the "fresh start" view and "are to be construed
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
principles. The most prescient article is Aug, Recent Trends in the Application
of Equitable Principles of Bankruptcy, 43 REF. 3. 109 (1969), written before the
Supreme Court decided Lines. See also Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 45 REF. J.
115 (1971) and Comment, 22 HAST.NGS L.J. 846 (1971). Case Comment, 49
N.C.L. Rmv. 738 (1971) is perhaps the best student work written in the area.
49SegaI makes this clear. See 382 U.S. 375 381 n.6 (1966).5 0 Case Comment, 49 N.C.L. REv. 738 740 (1971). The article cites Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924) in which the Court stated atpage 10:
Congress derives its power to enact a bankruptcy law from the Federal
Constitution, and the construction of it is a federal question. Of course
where the bankruptcy law deals with property rights which are regulated
by the state law, the federal courts in bankruptcy will follow the state
courts; but when the language of Congress indicates a policy re-
quiring a broader construction of the statute than the state decisions
would give it, federal courts cannot be precluded by them.
51425 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1970).
52 Comment, 49 N.C.L. Bnv. 738 n.3 (1971).
53 Id. at 740.
54 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
nn 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
1974] Co~umorrs 1121
2KTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
when reasonably possible in harmony with it so as to effectuate the
general purpose and policy of the [A]ct."56 That this represents the
predominant policy motivation behind the Act, however, is highly
questionable.57
One analysis5 8 argues that the "equitable" matter confronting the
Ninth Circuit in Lines may be divided into three categories: (1) the
hardship to the debtor which results if, having ascertained that the
"property" is transferable to the trustee, the court actually transfers it;
(2) the benefit to the creditors which will result if the asset is trans-
ferred-a comparison of the transfer value of the asset versus costs of
administration is one test; and (3) the feasibility of bankruptcy adminis-
tration of an asset that may turn out to be burdensome. This is actually
a mirror image of (2), that is, will the costs of administering the
asset so consume it that little or nothing ultimately reaches the creditors.
The major equitable concern in Lines was category (1). The
Court stated:
[T]he respondents here are wage earners whose sole source of in-
come, before and after bankruptcy, is their weekly earnings. The
function of their accrued vacation pay is to support the basic re-
quirements of life for them and their families during brief vacation
periods or in the event of layoff .... Where the minimal require-
ments for the economic survival of the debtor are at stake, legis-
latures have recognized that protection that might be unneces-
sary or unwise for other kinds of property may be required. See,
e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act ... 59
In contrast, at least one referee in bankruptcy has argued that the
statutory language of the Bankruptcy Act made the conclusion that
accrued vacation pay passed to the trustee "virtually inescapable".60
The Lines Court avoided that result by construing "property" in such
a way as to subordinate it to equitable "fresh start" policy grounds. In
so doing, the Court eschewed the rather clear language of Segal which
stated that the Bankruptcy Act was to be liberally construed and,
sotto voce, reiterated its policy, announced in Bank of Matin v. Eng-
56400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970), citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 24, 245
(1934).
57 See In re Leslie, 119 F. 406, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1903), where the deciding
judge, who had been a member of the House judiciary Committee during the
passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, points out that:
The main purpose of the bankrupt law is to prevent preferences, and
secure a fair and an equitable division of the bankrupt estate among the
creditors, not to grant discharges. This end accomplished, the bankrupt
is granted a discharge from all his debts. The attainment of the first is
not to be sacrificed to the accomplishment of the last.
Quoted in 49 N.C.L. REv. 738, at 745 n.42 (1971).
58 Comment, 22 HAsTrMcs L.J. 846, 854 (1971).
59 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970).60 Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 45 &EF. J. 115, 116 (1971).
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land,61 that bankruptcy jurisdiction was governed by equitable prin-
ciples.6
2
In a forward looking article written soon after Lines was decided,
one writer stated that with the Lines decision:
[T]he Court has opened "a clear field for future effort" on the part
of advocates for broadening the doctrine that in addition to the
exemption exclusion, the "purpose" of the Bankruptcy Act to pre-
serve for the debtor and his family the "minimal requirements for
economic survival" or the "basic requirements of life" places a
limitation on the kinds of property of the debtor which pass to the
trustee where the exemption exclusions appear to be inadequate.
63
Equitable Principles Rise to Preeminence
The above statement was quite correct, and Cedor was to be de-
cided upon precisely the ground it mentioned. Whether a court
proceeds from an equitable base or from the statutory language of
the Bankruptcy Act is determinative of the outcome of the newer tax
refund cases.
Consider, for example, the contrasting responses of the Ninth
and Second Circuits to the arguments raised in Cedor and Kokoszka
respectively:
In re Cedor
The Property Argument. The bankrupt contended that the reason-
ing of Lines dictated that the tax refunds be held not to be "property"
within the meaning of 70a(5). In Lines, he argued, there was accrued
but unpaid vacation pay which the bankrupt was unable to reach
prior to taking his vacation or terminating his employment, and here
61385 U.S. 99 (1966).
62 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966) is another example of
a case in which the Court seems to have ignored the clear statutory language of
the Act in favor of an equitable result.
The statutory language ignored was § 14c(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11
U.S.C. § 32,(5)( 1970) which provided:
(c) The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bank-
rupt has . . . (5) in a proceeding under this title commenced within
six years prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
had been granted a discharge, or had a composition or an arrangement
by way of composition or a wage earner's plan by way of composition
confirmed under this title....
Perry sought to receive an extension of time to pay his debts in a Chapter
XIII action. Within the preceeding six years, however, he had filed a straight
bankruptcy petition and had received a discharge. The referee dismissed Ferry's
motion, saying it was barred by § 14c(5). The decision was affied by the dis-
trict court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 340 F.2d 588 (6th Cir.
1965). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that § 14c(5) did not control
extension of debt payment plans, because such plans were created after the Bank-
ruptcy Act had been passed.63 Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 45 REF. J. 115, 118-19 (1971).
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(in Cedor) the bankrupt was likewise unable to reach the fund of
withheld wages prior to the filing of his federal income tax return."-
If, as the Court in Lines recognized, wages are "a specialized type of
property presenting distinct problems in our economic system" 65 surely
the forced overpayment of tax on wages represents a specialized type
of property, too. The Cedor court was most receptive to this reasoning,
finding that:
The collection by the Internal Revenue Service without the consent
or control of the bankrupt, and the belated refund, render these
funds quite similar in a practical sense, to the accrued but unpaid
wages which constituted vacation pay. If Lines stands for anything,
it is that the practical realities are controlling in this determina-
tion.66
Like accrued vacation pay, the tax refund, although uncertain as to
amount
* .* by reason of past experience, is anticipated by the wage
earner as an annual event. To deprive the wage earner of that
planned-on annually reoccurring payment, cannot be said to be less
severe than the deprivation of two weeks of paid vacation .... 67
The court holds that where the tax refund is generated by an
excess of the mandatory minimum amount required by law to be
withheld over the amount of the bankrupts actual tax liability at the
end of the year, the excess withholding is not 70a(5) property.68
The court so phrases its decision in order to prevent optional with-
holding amounts, controlled by the decision of the bankrupt, from being
unable to pass to the trustee; such optional withholding amounts are
held to be "property" and pass.69
The court in Cedor considers the "practicalities" to be controlling:
in other words, this is another in the sequence of decisions70 based upon
equitable considerations rather than the statutory dictates of the Act.
64337 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd per curiam sub nor. In re
James, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Walsh v. Cedor, 411
U.S. 973 (1973).
65400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970), citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
837, 340 (1969).
66337 F. Supp. 1103, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd per curiam sub norn. In re
James, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nor. Walsh v. Cedor,
411 U.S. 973 (1973).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1106.
7 0 The major cases in the sequence of equitable decisions have been men-
tioned several times in the text. They are: Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939);
Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966); Bank of Marin v. England,
385 U.S. 99 (1966). See Aug, Recent Trends in the Application of Equitable
Principles of Bankruptcy, 43 RIr. J. 109 (1969) for a discussion of the sequence.
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If construed in terms of the Act's statutory language, it is not clear
how one part of a tax refund can be held not to be property while
another part (if attributable to optional withholding) is held to be
property which passes.
The Garnishment Argument. Given that amounts attributable to
optional withholding are property and pass to the trustee, the bankrupt
then argued that the portion of the refund attributable to such optional
withholding is exempt, because if the trustee takes title to the whole
part of the refund check representing optional withholding, it is a
garnishment7' and is controlled by the Consumer Credit Protection
Act 72 [hereinafter cited as CCPA].
Under relevant provisions of the CCPA, only 25% of the "disposable
earnings" of a wage earner may be garnished.73 Calling the theory
that the income tax refund check is traceable to wages and that an
order to turn the check over to the trustee constitutes a garnishment
"somewhat strained",74 the court nonetheless accepts it, pointing out
that there was no reason "why the amount of the refund should be
held to have lost its character as 'earnings' by reason of its somewhat
circuitous route to the wage earner's hands."75 Since "garnishment"
is "any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any
individual are required to be withheld for the payment of any debt"78
and since the taking of title to the check by the trustee is a legal or
equitable procedure, the court finds that a garnishment exists.77
71 Id.
72 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1970) at § 1672(c) [hereinafter cited as CCPA].
73 15 U.S.C. § 1672 (1970) provides:
For the purposes of this subchapter:
(a) The term "earnings" means compensation paid or payable for per-
sonal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus,
or otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or
retirement program.
(b) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of
any individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of
any amounts required by law to be withheld.
(c) The term 'garnishment' means any legal or equitable procedure
through which the earnings of any individual are required to be with-
held for the payment of any debt.
15 U.S.C. 1673(a) (1970) reads in part:
S. . t]he maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an
individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not
exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week....
74337 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd per curiam sub nom. In
re James, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nor. Walsh v. Cedor, 411
U.S. 973 (1973).
75 Id.
76See 15 U.S.C. § 1672(c) (1970), the text of which is set out in note 73
supra.
77 337 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd per curiam sub nom. In re
James, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Walsh v. Cedor, 411
U.S. 973 (1973).
1974] 1125
KE CKY LAW JOURNAL[Vo
There are two counterarguments to this assertion. One author
points out that the cleavage date in bankruptcy is the point of the
filing of the petition and
[wihen tax refunds are in the custody of the sovereign on the date
of bankruptcy they are obviously not subject to levy ("garnish-
ment") and therefore do not pass to the trustee under the leviability
test. Nor do they pass to the trustee by operation of law merely
by virtue of the fact that the debtor has instituted the 'legal or
equitable" procedure known as bankruptcy. . . . [Tihe court in
Segal held that refunds pass to the trustee only if under the state
law the refunds are voluntarily alienable by the Bankrupt on the
date of bankruptcy.... [It is hard to understand] how an order of
the referee in bankruptcy, requiring the bankrupt to turn over his
tax refund where the title to the refund has already vested in the
trustee under the transferability test, can be construed as a garnish-
ment.78
The other argument is even more persuasive and has been ad-
vanced in both case law"9 and commentary. 0 "Disposable earnings", it
reasons, are those earnings for a pay period to which the employee is
entitled after all statutory deductions.8 ' Since disposable earnings
are all wages except the amount representing withholding monies, it
follows that withholding amounts cannot be classified as disposable
earnings, 2 and it is withholding monies that constitute the tax refund.
The withholding monies, so it is argued, thus lose their status as
"wages" and become instead a potential claim for a tax refund and
logically cannot resume their character as wages.83 Thus, withholdings
do not fall under the coverage of the CCPA. Moreover, from the
language of the CCPA, one can argue that the restrictions in it were
"tailored to protect the individual's disposable earnings in the par-
ticular pay period," since the statute refers not to earnings generally,
but "only to 'aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any
workweek' or multiple thereof."84 Congressional intent in enacting
the CCPA was "to make sure that wage earners were able to receive
7 8 Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 47 REF. J. 239, 244 (1973).
79 In re Kingswood, 343 F. Supp. 498, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1972) rev'd in favor
of Cedar, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), petition for cert. Jled sub noam. Michel-
man v. Kingswood, 42 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1973) (No. 289); In re
March, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BANim. L. REP. . 64,748 (D.R.I. 1973).80 Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 47 REF. J. 239, 245 (1973).
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 1672(c) (1970), the text of which is set out in note 73
supra.8 2 Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 47 REF. J. 239, 245 (1973)
83 In re March, [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] BAma. L. REP. fI 64,748 (D.R.L
1973).8 4 Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 47 RMF. J. 239, 244-45 (1973) (emphasis
added). See also Hodgson v. Cleveland Municipal Court, 326 F. Supp. 419 (N.D.
Ohio 1971).
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at least 75% of their take home pay in any one pay period so that they
would have enough cash to meet basic needs."85 Subchapter II of the
CCPA-Restrictions on Gamishment"88-restricts certain methods a
creditor may use to reach a debtor's wages, and "only by a play on
words can such legislation be termed an Exemption Statute."87
Cedor is clearly an equitable decision, and is reconcilable to the
main trend of case authority only on these grounds. Given the statutory
language of the Bankruptcy Act, the clear legislative intent, and the
Segal doctrine, the decision appears to be an aberration, or as one
writer put it, "an errant sibling of Lines v. Frederick."88
In re Kokoszka
The Property Argument. The decision in Kokoszka, that court
points out, is controlled by Segal and Lines.89 Whether an item is
"property" or not must be defined in terms of the purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 90 and "property" must be "given a generous construction
in order to give creditors everything of value, including items where
the enjoyment of value is postponed. . . ."91 Lines, says the Kokoszka
court, limits the concept of property where the bankrupt is a wage
earner and where "the minimal requirements for the economic survival
of the debtor are at stake."9
2
The court further indicates that the test of whether an item is
property is the same as the Segal test: is it "sufficiently rooted in the
pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupt's ability
to make a fresh start that it should be regarded as 'property' under §
70a(5)?"93 This test announced in Segal might be fairly regarded
as the precursor of the equitable loophole created in Lines, but in
Segal the test was clearly subordinate to the policy behind the Bank-
ruptcy Act-to secure for creditors everything of value a bankrupt
might possess at the moment of bankruptcy.
The Second Circuit views Lines as a "very narrow exception to
85 In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub
nom. Kokoszka v. Belford, 414 U.S. 1091 (1973).
88 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1970).
87 In re Kingswood, 343 F. Supp. 498, 501 (C.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd in favor of
Cedor, 470 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1972), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Michelman v.
Kingswood, 42 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1973) (No. 289). The appendix at-
tached to the case, written by the referee in bankruptcy in the action below, is very
informative of the purposes behind enactment of the CCPA.88 Lee, Leading Case Commentary, 47 REF. J. 239, 240 (1973).
89479 F.2d 990, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Kokoszka v.
Belford, 414 U.S. 1091 (1973).
90 Id. at 994 (emphasis added).
91 Id., citing Segal v. Rochelle 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966).
92 Id., citing Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970).
93Id.
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the general proposition that everything of value passes to the trustee.
•. .,,0 Only when the item to be regarded as property is "essential to
basic week to week support in the future" does it not pass to the
trustee95 (given, of course, that it is alienable or leviable under state
law at the moment the bankruptcy petition is filed). The court then
says:
Because a tax refund is not the weekly or other periodic income
required by a wage earner for his basic support, to deprive him of
it will not hinder his ability to make a fresh start unhampered by
the pressure of preexisting debt.0 6
The court counters the argument that a tax refund represents
overwithheld wages and that wages are a specialized type of property
which does not pass to the trustee by replying that to classify property
as "wages" does not render it sacrosanct nor "... give it special
protection, for to do so would exempt from the bankruptcy estate
most of the property owned by many bankrupts, such as savings
accounts... ,,97
The Kokoszka court notes that the argument that an income tax
refund was an expected annual event and that taking it away would
deny a fresh start was an argument which convinced the Cedor court.
In response, to this, the Second Circuit likens a tax refund to a
Christmas Club account 98 and says that an expectation of a special
source of income after bankruptcy does not have anything to do with
whether or not an asset is "property" and further finds that the
retention of a tax refund would not be giving the bankrupt a "fresh
start," but a "head start" over those who received no tax refund.0 9
The bankrupt also argued that the tax refund should not be held
to be property because the refund, as it is usually small, will not reach
the creditors, but will instead be consumed in administration ex-
penses.100 The court concedes that this argument has merit, but in-
sists that the proper solution is not to declare that tax refunds are not
property and do not pass, but rather for the debtor to move the
94 Id.
05 Id. at 994-95.
06 Id. at 995.
97 Id.
98 The Christmas Club analogy was first used in In re Stanley, [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] BANmm. L. REP. U64,160 (E.D. Va. 1971).
9 479 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nor. Kokoszka v. Bel-
ford 414 U.S. 1091 f1973). The argument that the retention of the property
would not be giving a 'fresh start" but a "head start" over others was first made by
Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent to Lines. See 400 U.S. 18, 22 (1970).
100 479 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Kokoszka v.
Belford, 414 U.S. 1091 (1973).
1128 [Vol. 62
bankruptcy court for an order of abandonment,1 1 which may be
granted at the sound discretion of the referee.
The Garnishment Argument. The court in Kokoszka holds that tax
refunds are not "earnings" and thus are not regulated by the CCPA;
the intent of Congress in passing CCPA, °2 as noted above, was to
insure that wage earners received at least 75% of their take home pay
in order to meet basic needs. It is quite correct that Congress intended
that "earnings" mean "periodic payments of compensation and [do]
not pertain to every asset that is traceable in some way to some
compensation." 03 This is a corollary of the argument above that
"disposable earnings" do not include withholdings, that tax refund
checks represent withholding, and therefore that a refund check is
not composed of disposable earnings and thus is not controlled by the
CCPA.
CONCLUSION
This article has tried to trace the development of the concept of
"property", with a particular focus on the intended scope of that
term as it was embodied in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and subsequent
amendments. New, valuable, and unusual property interests have
arisen, and the courts have been faced with the problem of deciding
whether or not these interests fall within the scope of section 70a or,
more particularly, section 70a(5) of the Act. The test enumerated
by clause (5) is two-fold: (1) could the property have been trans-
ferred by the bankrupt as of the date he filed his petition or (2) is the
property reachable under judicial process? Although this is the
language included in the statute, one way courts have avoided classi-
fying an interest as property has been to hold that Congress never
intended the Act to reach such interests.
To argue that Congress never intended to reach the interest is to
argue policy, and, as indicated above, from the legislative history of
the Act it is clear that the primary policy behind enactment of the
statute was to insure that every asset which the bankrupt possessed
on the date he filed his petition is equitably distributed among his
creditors. The policy of giving the bankrupt a fresh start was
originally quite secondary in the minds of Congress. At this com-
paratively early stage of historical development, an asset, if leviable or
transferable, passed to the trustee unless it was prevented from doing
101 Id. at 996. An order of abandonment may be made pursuant to section
67c(5) of the Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(5) (1970).
102 Id. at 997.
103 Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 870.10(b) (1973).
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so by applicable state law. A few present-day state laws are so worded
that an income tax refund is not transferable. 04
In Segal v. Rochelle,10 5 the Supreme Court followed the mandate
of the language of the Bankruptcy Act, holding that an inchoate loss
carryback tax refund claim passed to the trustee, the Federal Assign-
ment of Claims Act notwithstanding. This represents the outer limit
of the Court's definition of property; the Segal opinion focused upon
the policy behind enactment of the Bankruptcy Act and the require-
ments dictated by its language.
The remaining question is, then, what effect the Supreme Court's
decision in Lines v. Frederick'0 6 has had upon this expansive definition
of property? Some courts view Lines as carving out a very narrow
exception to the general rule and hold that Segal stands for that general
rule. 07 These courts continue to announce that the "general trend
has been toward making the term 'property' within the Bankruptcy
Act broader and inclusive of 'a larger range of interests." 00
Considerable commentary has been devoted to the point that there
is a continuing series of bankruptcy decisions based on equitable
rather than statutory principles stretching all the way back to the
seminal case of Pepper v. Litton.00 The Supreme Court has period-
ically reaffirmed the theory that equitable principles predominate in
bankruptcy cases in such decisions as Bank of Matin v. England"0
and Perry v. Commerce Loan Co."' Some commentators argue that
Lines is another of these equitable decisions and that the recent trend
of the Supreme Court has been to base its decisions upon equitable
principles.12
It is this writer's opinion that Kokoszka and Cedor each represent
one line of this conflicting reasoning; Cedor is the progeny of the
equitable decisions, while Kokoszka follows the traditional, statutorily-
based line of cases. Competing policy considerations are thus at
stake-the dictates of the Act and the intent behind it versus the in-
creased concern of the Court for a minimal standard of economic
104 See, e.g., In re Perry, 225 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
105 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
100 400 U.S. 18 (1970).
107 In re Kokoszka, 479 F.2d 990, 994 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom.
Kokoszka v. Belford, 414 U.S. 1091 (1973); In re Jones, 337 F. Supp. 620, 624
(D. Minn. 1971), leave to appeal denied, (8th Cir. May 14, 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1040 (1972).
108 337 F. Supp. 620 (D. Minn. 1971).
109 808 U.S. 295 (1939).
110 385 U.S. 99 (1966>.
111 383 U.S. 392 (1966). See note 58 supra.
112 See, e.g., Aug, Recent Trends in the Application of Equitable Principles of
Bankruptcy, 43 BEF. J. 109 (1969).
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well-being for U.S. citizens. Thus the lines are drawn, and the Supreme
Court will decide the issue in the summer of 1974.
ADDENDum
The United States Supreme Court, on June 19, 1974,118 announced
in Kokoszka v. Belford"4 that. an income tax refund is "property"
which passes to the trustee under section 70a(5) and thus resolved
the debate with which this Comment has been concerned. The Court
noted the dual (and often conflicting) concerns of the Bankruptcy Act:
It is the twofold purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to convert the
estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors
and then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions
and rights as the statute left untouched.115
Segal and Lines are briefly reviewed by the Court, which views the
opposite holdings of the two cases from a functional viewpoint: "In
each case, the Court found the crucial analytical key not in an abstract
articulation of the statute's purpose but in an analysis of the nature of
the asset involved in light of those principles."11 6
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that
income tax refunds, like the vacation pay in Lines, are derived from
wages.1 7 The difference between the two is that vacation pay was
"designed to function as a wage substitute ... to 'support the basic
requirements of life for [the debtors] and their families. .. "118
Citing with approval the Second Circuit's finding that a tax refund
was not a wage substitute upon which the wage earner depended for
his basic support," 9 the Court held that unlike depriving the bankrupt
of his accrued vacation pay, depriving him of his income tax refund
will not hamper his ability to make a fresh start. 20 Thus, the fact
that vacation pay is designed to function as a wage substitute, while a
tax refund is not, was a "crucial" distinction.121 The Court thereupon
reiterated the Segal test122 and held "that the income tax refund is
113 At the date the foregoing article was completed, the decision analyzed
herein had not been rendered, although certiorari bad been granted. Any discus-
sion of the final status of the income tax refund as an asset of the wage earner's
bankruptcy estate would be incomplete without a brief addendum on the outcome
of the case.
114 42 U.S.L.W. 4952 (U.S. June 19, 1974).
115 Id. at 4953, citing Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913).
116 42 U.S.L.W. 4952, 4953 (U.S. June 19, 1974) (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 4954.
118 Id., citing Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970) (emphasis added).
119 479 F.2d 990, 994 (2d Cir. 1973).
120 42 U.S.L.W. 4952, 4954 (U.S. June 19, 1974).
121 Id.
1
2 2 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
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'sufficiently rooted in the [sic] bankruptcy past' to be defined as 'prop-
erty' under § 70a(5) :123
The Court further found that while tax refunds have their source
in wages, they were not "disposable earnings" within the meaning
of the CCPA124 and thus were not subject to the wage garnishment
restrictions12 5 of that Act. The legislative history of the CCPA, the
Court concluded, "fully support[s] "12 6 the view
*.. that Congress, in an effort to avoid the necessity of bankruptcy,
sought to regulate garnishment in its usual sense as a levy on
periodic payments of compensation needed to support the wage
earner and his family on a week-to-week, month-to-month basis.'27
"Periodic payments of compensation" do not include tax refunds, nor
do they include "every asset that is traceable in some way to such
compensation"'1
2 8
However sound this decision may be as a construction of applicable
principles of the Bankruptcy Act, one clear indication emerges. The
two conflicting lines of decisions-those based upon the statutory
language of the Act and those based upon equitable principles-still
remain. This decision does little to resolve the conflict. Indeed, such
language as quoted above, i.e., that the Court finds "the crucial ana-
lytical key not in an abstract formulation of the statute's purpose
but in an analysis of the nature of the asset involved in light of those
principles," 29 seems but an indication that future determinations of
whether or not new and unusual assets are 70a(5) "property" will be
made on an ad hoc basis only. One would have hoped for clearer
principles to emerge from this conflict.
Michael B. Colgan
12342 U.S.L.W. 4952, 4954 (U.S. June 19,1974).
224 Id. at 4955.
125The applicable wage garnishment restrictions of the CCPA are discussed
in the text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
12642 U.S.L.W. 4952, 4955 (U.S. June 19, 1974).
127 Id.
1281d.
129 Id. at 4953.
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